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SOBA is an approach to election verification that provides observers withjustifiably high confidence that the reported results of an election areconsistent with an audit trail ("ballots"), which can be paper or electronic.SOBA combines three ideas: (1) publishing cast vote records (CVRs) separatelyfor each contest, so that anyone can verify that each reported contest outcomeis correct, if the CVRs reflect voters' intentions with sufficient accuracy;(2) shrouding a mapping between ballots and the CVRs for those ballots toprevent the loss of privacy that could occur otherwise; (3) assessing theaccuracy with which the CVRs reflect voters' intentions for a collection ofcontests while simultaneously assessing the integrity of the shrouded mappingbetween ballots and CVRs by comparing randomly selected ballots to the CVRsthat purport to represent them. Step (1) is related to work by the HumboldtCounty Election Transparency Project, but publishing CVRs separately forindividual contests rather than images of entire ballots preserves privacy.Step (2) requires a cryptographic commitment from elections officials.Observers participate in step (3), which relies on the "super-simplesimultaneous single-ballot risk-limiting audit." Step (3) is designed to revealrelatively few ballots if the shrouded mapping is proper and the CVRsaccurately reflect voter intent. But if the reported outcomes of the contestsdiffer from the outcomes that a full hand count would show, step (3) isguaranteed to have a large chance of requiring all the ballots to be counted byhand, thereby limiting the risk that an incorrect outcome will become officialand final.

SOBA: Secrecy-preserving Observable Ballot-level Audit