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Stability of evolutionary dynamics of non-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma gamewith non-uniform interaction rates [1], via benefit and cost dilemma is studied. Moreover, the stability condition (b+c/b-c)2 < r1r3 is derived in case ofcoexistence between cooperators and defectors .If r1,r3 -> infinity cooperationis the dominant strategy and defectors can no longer exploit cooperators.

On stability in dynamical Prisoner's dilemma game with non-uniform interaction rates