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In this paper, we present a multi-period trading model in the style of Kyle(1985)'s inside trading model, by assuming that there are at least two insidersin the market with long-lived private information, under the requirement thateach insider publicly discloses his stock trades after the fact. Based on thismodel, we study the influences of "public disclosure" and "competition amonginsiders" on the trading behaviors of insiders. We find that the "competitionamong insiders" leads to higher effective price and lower insiders' profits,and the "public disclosure" makes each insider play a mixed strategy in everyround except the last one. An interesting find is that as the total number ofauctions goes to infinity, the market depth and the trading intensity at thefirst auction are all constants with the requirement of "public disclosure",while the market depth at the first auction goes to zero and the tradingintensity of the first period goes to infinity without the requirement of"public disclosure".Moreover, we give the exact speed of the revelation of theprivate information, and show that all information is revealed immediately andthe market depth goes to infinity immediately as trading happens infinitelyfrequently.

Inside Trading, Public Disclosure and Imperfect Competition