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This work considers coordination and bargaining between two selfish usersover a Gaussian interference channel. The usual information theoretic approachassumes full cooperation among users for codebook and rate selection. In thescenario investigated here, each user is willing to coordinate its actions onlywhen an incentive exists and benefits of cooperation are fairly allocated. Theusers are first allowed to negotiate for the use of a simple Han-Kobayashi typescheme with fixed power split. Conditions for which users have incentives tocooperate are identified. Then, two different approaches are used to solve theassociated bargaining problem. First, the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) isused as a tool to get fair information rates and the operating point isobtained as a result of an optimization problem. Next, a dynamicalternating-offer bargaining game (AOBG) from bargaining theory is introducedto model the bargaining process and the rates resulting from negotiation arecharacterized. The relationship between the NBS and the equilibrium outcome ofthe AOBG is studied and factors that may affect the bargaining outcome arediscussed. Finally, under certain high signal-to-noise ratio regimes, thebargaining problem for the generalized degrees of freedom is studied.

A Game-Theoretic View of the Interference Channel: Impact of Coordination and Bargaining