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We present three voting protocols with unconditional privacy and correctness,without assuming any bound on the number of corrupt participants. All protocolshave polynomial complexity and require private channels and a simultaneousbroadcast channel. Unlike previously proposed protocols in this model, theprotocols that we present deterministically output the exact tally. Our firstprotocol is a basic voting scheme which allows voters to interact in order tocompute the tally. Privacy of the ballot is unconditional in the sense thatregardless of the behavior of the dishonest participants nothing can be learnedthrough the protocol that could not be learned in an ideal realisation.Unfortunately, a single dishonest participant can make the protocol abort, inwhich case the dishonest participants can nevertheless learn the outcome of thetally. Our second protocol introduces voting authorities which improves thecommunication complexity by limiting interaction to be only between voters andauthorities and among the authorities themselves; the simultaneous broadcast isalso limited to the authorities. In the second protocol, as long as a singleauthority is honest, the privacy is unconditional, however, a single corruptauthority or a single corrupt voter can cause the protocol to abort. Our finalprotocol provides a safeguard against corrupt voters by enabling a verificationtechnique to allow the authorities to revoke incorrect votes without abortingthe protocol. Finally, we discuss the implementation of a simultaneousbroadcast channel with the use of temporary computational assumptions, yieldingversions of our protocols that achieve everlasting security.

Exact, Efficient and Information-Theoretically Secure Voting with an Arbitrary Number of Cheaters