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This paper discusses the role of opportunistic punisher who may act selfishlyto free-ride cooperators or not to be exploited by defectors. To consideropportunistic punisher, we make a change to the sequence of one-shot publicgood game; instead of putting action choice first before punishment, thecommitment of punishment is declared first before choosing the action of eachparticipant. In this commitment-first setting, punisher may use informationabout her team, and may defect to increase her fitness in the team. Reversingsequence of public good game can induce different behavior of punisher, whichcannot be considered in standard setting where punisher always choosescooperation. Based on stochastic dynamics developed by evolutionary economistsand biologists, we show that opportunistic punisher can make cooperation evolvewhere cooperative punisher fails. This alternative route for the evolution ofcooperation relies paradoxically on the players' selfishness to profit fromothers' unconditional cooperation and defection.

The Role of Opportunistic Punishment in the Evolution of Cooperation: An application of stochastic dynamics to public good game