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This paper investigates design of noncooperative games from an optimizationand control theoretic perspective. Pricing mechanisms are used as a design toolto ensure that the Nash equilibrium of a fairly general class of noncooperativegames satisfies certain global objectives such as welfare maximization orachieving a certain level of quality-of-service (QoS). The class of gamesconsidered provide a theoretical basis for decentralized resource allocationand control problems including network congestion control, wireless uplinkpower control, and optical power control. The game design problem is analyzedunder different knowledge assumptions (full versus limited information) anddesign objectives (QoS versus utility maximization) for separable andnon-separable utility functions. The ``price of anarchy'' is shown not to be aninherent feature of full-information games that incorporate pricing mechanisms.Moreover, a simple linear pricing is shown to be sufficient for design of Nashequilibrium according to a chosen global objective for a fairly general classof games. Stability properties of the game and pricing dynamics are studiedunder the assumption of time-scale separation and in two separate time-scales.Thus, sufficient conditions are derived, which allow the designer to place theNash equilibrium solution or to guide the system trajectory to a desired regionor point. The obtained results are illustrated with a number of examples.

An Optimization and Control Theoretic Approach to Noncooperative Game Design