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A terrorist group’s (TG) ability to withstand attacks and recovered from sudden high strength depreciation after a major counterterrorism operation, as well as the Security Agencies’ (SA) ability to execute successful credible counter-terrorism operation is a function of both their individual bureaucratic structures and the level of community’s supports each organization is able to optimize within the period of operation. To study the security implications of undermining a given community’s optimal supports, we present and analysed a two-person two-periods evolutionary Original Research Article Oladejo et al.; CJAST, 39(47): 45-67, 2020; Article no.CJAST.63852 46 game theoretic model for an interaction between the SA and the TG; each playing either the “Sticks” or the “Carrots” or mixed strategies to win the community’s optimal supports. In the symmetric game variant, the result of the analysis shows that if the operational cost drops by 80%, then the SA playing the “Stick” may enjoy 50:50 chance of winning the community’s optimal supports. But if the cost rises by at least 30%, then SA playing the “Sticks” would be at-most 33.3% advantageous, while the “Carrots” approach would yield at-least 66.7% advantage. In the asymmetric variant, if the operational cost drops by 80%, then SA playing the “Sticks” would enjoy 100% chance of winning the community’s optimal supports, while the “Carrots” would yield at most 20% advantage. But if the cost rises by at least 30%, then SA playing the “Sticks” would enjoy 50:50 advantage. Comparatively, the TG would enjoy 50:50 chance of winning the community’s optimal supports by playing the “Sticks” if the cost of operation drops by 90%. But if the cost rises by at least 20%, then TG playing the “Sticks” would enjoy at most 33.3% while the “Carrots” would yield at least 66.7% advantage. Thus, the cost of operation is the major determinant of either player’s strategic approach. Under the mixed strategy, if the benefit of operation exceeds its cost, then SA playing the “Sticks” is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), otherwise, combining the “Sticks and Carrots” simultaneously would yield an ESS. Summarily, the SAs’ stake in terrorism prevention and control using the “Sticks” approach is proportional to its operational cost and vice versa. Therefore, considering the capital intensive as well as the intelligence deficient characteristics of the “Sticks” approach, the SA cannot prevent/control terrorism using the “Stick” instruments only. Rather a viable “Carrots” approach or its combination with credible “Sticks” instruments would be necessary and sufficient to win the community’s optimal supports for effective terrorism prevention and control.

Optimizing the Community’s Supports in Counter-Terrorism Operations: A Sticks – Carrots Game Theoretic Model