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On March 11, 2011, Japan was struck by a powerful earthquake that resulted in tsunami damage. In addition to the destruction within Japan, several ports in northern California were also affected. Two harbors in California suffered major vessel and infrastructure casualties which resulted in large amounts of oil and hazardous substances in the water from various sources. The agencies responding to these harbors found themselves with several challenges: (1) assessing and responding to a rare and enormous event that had the potential to effect the entire west coast; (2) organizing the tactical operations and logistical support for the two most effected locations which were 430-miles apart; and (3) assessing and mitigating unknown safety hazards in the water and then determining an appropriate funding source. Damage reports from various cities, including Richmond, Fort Bragg and Crescent City, followed over the next few hours. Response teams deployed to mitigate the greatest threats, though some of threats weren't immediately obvious. The response became a two-branch operation, focused on Santa Cruz and Crescent City, each with distinctive problems and separated by a difficult distance, with a central Incident Command Post (ICP) directing the response. The pollution potential and economic significance was far greater in the northern city, leading the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) to create an Area Command. This eventually evolved into a single remote ICP. While only considered a type-3 event, Federal On-Scene Coordinator Representatives (FOSCRs) were strained to their limits on Advanced ICS knowledge, financial management, and interagency salvage. In this event, the Coast Guard struggled with, but succeeded in dealing with, a catastrophe that no one on the West Coast had dealt with in almost 50 years.

CHALLENGES OF AN NCP RESPONSE TO THE TSUNAMI OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA IN 2011