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The aim of this paper is to analyse Marilyn Duckworth’s Married Alive within the framework of Simone de Beauvoir’s philosophy of ambiguity, risk and reciprocal recognition. It is argued that the New Zealand writer represents human relationships both as a potential threat to one’s subjectivity, conceptualising them in terms of confl ict and competition, and a necessity that may enrich both parties. What is celebrated in the novel as the key to establishing a mutually rewarding bond is the wilful acceptance of risk and reciprocal recognition of oneself and the lover as both subject and object. Discussing the context for the emergence of existential philosophy, William Barrett refl ects as follows: “It appears that man is willing to learn about himself only after some disaster; [...]. What he learns has always been there, lying beneath the surface of even the best-functioning societies” (35). Just as the seismic upheavals of the twentieth century drove philosophers to contemplate the absurdity of the human condition, so, too, an epidemic of insanity that sweeps across near-future New Zealand in the wake of fl u vaccine contamination awakens the 40-year-old female protagonist of Marilyn Duckworth’s Married Alive (1985) to her existential ambiguity. Faced with an ever-present threat, Francie develops a heightened awareness of herself as both subject and object, living and approaching death, and, most crucially, separate from and connected to other people. She also comes to realise the strained dynamics of interhuman relationships, which are simultaneously a necessity and a possibly lethal menace, with infected people acting in an unpredictably violent manner. As the plot unfolds, it transpires, in line with Barrett’s remark, that the epidemic not so much generates but rather exposes and exacerbates the deeply rooted anxieties: “Only in some Polynesian circles does the family system continue rebelliously, resulting in deaths from violence, bizarre injuries to every part of the body. This is the price of love today. Was it ever diff erent?” (Duckworth 1985, 14). 136 Anna Orzechowska The confl ictual nature of interhuman relationships viewed as an existential problem has been a thematic staple of Duckworth’s fi ction since her literary debut in 1959: “In my writing as well as in my life I’ve been occupied by the tension between needing love and needing independence. [...] The paradox I’ve aimed to explore is that love, which is as necessary as the air we breathe, can also be the very thing that suff ocates. It is a human dilemma [...]” (Duckworth 2000, 291). This preoccupation with the challenging task of striking a balance between personal freedom and engagement with other people, coupled with an emphasis on the ambiguity of the human condition, resonates strongly with existential philosophy, in particular the thought of Simone de Beauvoir. Indeed, Dale Benson argues that Duckworth’s novels are rich with existentialist overtones, not as a result of the writer’s informed philosophical interests, but rather as a refl ection of the Zeitgeist (207). Accordingly, in her brief analysis of Married Alive, the scholar indicates that the novel is characterised by the typically existentialist focus on the overlap between the human need for “self-reliance” and that for community (Benson 224). Apt as Benson’s insights are, they still lack grounding in specifi c philosophical concepts. The aim of this paper is thus to supplant them and bring to more precise expression by drawing close parallels between the novel and de Beauvo ir’s philosophy. In what follows it will be claimed that, just as de Beauvoir, Duckworth sees interhuman relationships as a potential threat to individual subjectivity, conceptualising them in terms of confl ict and competition. Nonetheless, to avoid this threat by choosing isolation or oppression over companionship, as the characters of Married Alive are prone to do, is to fall into bad faith and constrain one’s own self-fulfi lment. In order to establish a rewarding bond, both parties should recognise their mutual vulnerability and embrace risk, an endeavour that may be accomplished only through their concerted eff ort. The second section of this paper will adumbrate those aspects of de Beauvoir’s thought that are germane to the subject at hand. The third section will examine the existential condition of the female protagonist, focusing on its multidimensional ambiguity. The fi nal section will dwell, for one thing, on the risks involved in interhuman relationships and, for another, on the ideal of reciprocal recognition as represented in the novel. 1. Simone de Beauvoir’s Philosophy of Ambiguity, Risk and Reciprocal Recognition In her Ethics of Ambiguity, Simone de Beauvoir locates the core of the human condition in ambiguity, whereby one is simultaneously “a sovereign and unique subject amidst a universe of objects” (1948,7) and “an object for others” (1948, 7). This fundamental tension fi nds its most striking manifestation in the experience of the body. On the one hand, the body constitutes a living subject endowed with a capacity to transcend itself; it mediates between human consciousness and the “I’ll risk you, if you’ll risk me”: Th e Ambiguity of Human Existence... 137 external reality, being “our grasp on the world and the outline for our projects” (de Beauvoir 2011, 68). On the other hand, in its material and biological dimension, the body is also “an immanent object” (Cataldi 86) and pure facticity over which one has only limited control. As such, it wavers between interiority and exteriority, simultaneously belonging and not belonging to oneself. An autonomous and self-contained entity, each person is thus at the same time inextricably connected to the world at large, a paradox that takes central place in de Beauvoir’s thought: “An ethics of ambiguity will be one which will refuse to deny a priori that separate existants can, at the same time, be bound to each other, that their individual freedoms can forge laws valid for all” (1948, 18). Human beings, however, are reluctant, if not downright unwilling, to acknowledge their existential ambiguity (de Beauvoir 2011, 859), wherein lies the root of interpersonal hostility. Since the awareness of being not only an autonomous subject but also a mere object inevitably gives rise to anxiety, each individual seeks to conceal his or her true condition at the cost of other people, regarded as “a threat and a danger” (de Beauvoir 2011, 113). Accordingly, drawing on Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, de Beauvoir describes interhuman relationships as a site of struggle for domination: “each consciousness seeks to posit itself alone as a sovereign subject. Each one tries to accomplish itself by reducing the other to slavery” (2011, 193). It should be emphasised, however, that her approach is markedly less confl ict-oriented than that presented by other existentialist philosophers, most notably Jean Paul Sartre (Deutscher 44). While he focuses on how one is irremediably thwarted by the other in the exercise of freedom and the maintenance of undivided subjectivity, de Beauvoir accords equal signifi cance to the contribution that every foreign consciousness brings into one’s life, endowing it with meaning and substance (1948, 71). More than that, in her philosophy, the other becomes a condition sine qua non for one’s potential as a human being to be fully realised: “Thus, we see that no existence can be validly fulfi lled if it is limited to itself. It appeals to the existence of others” (de Beauvoir 1948, 67). Crucially also, in contrast to her lifetime partner, de Beauvoir makes a strong case for the possibility of surpassing the state of mutual enmity (Gothlin 137). What is required is the “free recognition of each individual in the other, each one positing both itself and the other as object and as subject in a reciprocal movement” (de Beauvoir 2011, 193). It is the reciprocal recognition of oneself and the other as ambiguous and free that forms the foundation of an “authentic love” and guarantees mutual self-fulfi lment: “neither [lover] would abdicate his transcendence, they would not mutilate themselves; [...]. For each of them, love would be revelation of self and the enrichment of universe” (de Beauvoir 2011, 798). The sphere that, according to de Beauvoir, lends itself best to this project is eroticism. In sexual intercourse, each party naturally experiences himself or herself as a subject that desires and an object that is desired by the lover (de Beauvoir 2011, 476), and, most importantly, this experience elicits a sense of relish, rather 138 Anna Orzechowska than anguish. This is not to say, however, that de Beauvoir provides a utopian vision of a harmonious community where each person would eagerly forego all egoistic inclinations. Being aware of the fl awed human nature, the philosopher emphasises that the ideal of reciprocal recognition calls for a tremendous commitment and eff ort from both lovers, and, even if these are off ered, it will still elude full grasp: “But friendship and generosity [...] are not easy virtues; they are undoubtedly man’s highest accomplishments; this is where he is in his truth: but this truth is a struggle endlessly begun, endlessly abolished” (de Beauvoir 2011, 193). Consequently, any encounter with the other must inevitably imply a threat to one’s subjectivity. But since isolation precludes authentic freedom, the only ethical stance to be adopted is to face the risk and its implications, bearing in mind that “if there were not the risk of loss, there would not be salvation either” (de Beauvoir 2011, 281). 2. Epidemic of Ambiguity Duckworth’s novel opens with a somewhat curious, yet telling, scene that sets the tone for the whole novel and introduces a number of existentialist concerns that form its thematic texture: She [Francie] stands straight and naked in the cubicle, with her knicker over her head [...]. Although t

“I’ll risk you, if you’ll risk me”: The Ambiguity of Human Existence and Relationships in Marilyn Duckworth’s Married Alive