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This article explores the representations of French diplomats and military chiefs on the methods of ensuring security of Mediterranean communications against the background of unfolding Austrian crisis in the spring of 1938. Although national and foreign researchers discusses the existence of a threat to French communications in the Mediterranean, Paris&amp;rsquo; position on this problem alongside the change of its approach, have not previously become the subject of separate research. The author attempts to elucidate why Paris resorted to the questions of military cooperation with London in the Mediterranean Region precisely in the spring of 1938. The author relied on the achievements of the realist school of the theory of international relations in defining the concept of security. The conclusion is formulated that consolidation of Italy and Germany in the strategically important areas of the region &amp;ndash; Spanish Morocco and Balearic Islands, which took place during the Spanish War, posed a serious threat to French communications in the Mediterranean. French military officers believed that particular danger to Paris&amp;rsquo; positions in the region came from Italy. In the course of escalation of the Austrian crisis, the stance of Paris on the defense of communications varied. If in February 1938, the French military chiefs were assumed that security of communications could be ensured by signing an agreement, &amp;nbsp;after the Anschluss they considered conducting military operations in the Mediterranean Region in the instance of the beginning of war. Paris was concerned about consolidation of &amp;ldquo;axis&amp;rdquo; powers in the region, and a year ahead of London raised the question on conducting combat operations in the Mediterranean. However, without the support of Great Britain, France was incapable of achieving full protection of its Mediterranean interests.	

The problem of security of Mediterranean communications in French policy in the spring of 1938.