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A solid international legal framework for family planning supports national family planning programs. Yet it is not by itself a program guarantee, especially among Muslim nations, many of which have stalled FP transitions and weak or absent government assistance for FP programs. The success of Iran’s family planning program, therefore, is all the more noteworthy. Since its establishment in 1993, it has been one of the most successful state family planning (FP) programs in the world, having reduced the national annual growth rate from 2.7% in the late 1960s to little over 1% currently. This paper explores international and national legal, institutional, demographic, and cultural-geographical influences that may have contributed to its results. Key-words: Iran, post-revolution, Islam, Shariat, family planning, fertility, population geography, urbanization, education, religion, globalization, cultural geography. 112 M.Alaeddini • D. López-Carr Some biological and behavioral factors, such as the use of contraception, directly affect the fertility rate. There are, however, socioeconomic, cultural and environmental variables that indirectly underlie the change in the fertility rate. For instance, studies indicate that fertility is usually higher in rural than in urban areas, and higher in households with low incomes (Bongaarts 1978; Merrick 2001; Carr et al. 2006). Moreover, it is well-established that quality and quantity of women’s education are highly predictive determinants of the fertility rate (e.g. Caldwell 1980). Religion and culture can also be influential (Reichenbach 2009). Our aim in this paper is to discuss and evaluate various underlying fertility determinants that were present in Iran’s FP. We examine the extent to which several of these socioeconomic, cultural and environmental determinants may have enabled Iran’s decline in fertility. Iran’s first Family Planning policy was introduced in 1967 under Shah Reza Pahlavi to improve the status of women by reforming divorce laws, encouraging female employment, and acknowledging family planning as a human right. But the program had little success due to a low literacy rate, general apprehension, and other cultural obstacles. At that time, the average growth rate was 2.7%, similar to other developing countries lacking widespread family planning methods. The FP policy was reversed in 1979 at the beginning of the Islamic Revolution (Larsen 2001). The government at the time implemented legal changes in marriage laws, including the reduction of the age of marriage, elimination of limitations on polygamy, provision of financial support for new couples, and provision of land to families with more than five children (Moinifar 2007). At that time, FP programs were viewed by government sources as a western imperialist influence over the country. Following the outbreak of the war between Iran and Iraq (1980–1988), Ayatollah Khomeini urged people to have larger families to support a "soldiers for Islam" increase to "an army of 20 millions". According to United Nations data on Iran, the population doubled from 27 million in 1968 to 55 million in 1988. In the post war period, Iran’s rapid population growth was considered by many a crucial obstacle to reconstructing the country. In response, Ayatollah Khomeini reopened discussions on the subject of FP (Larsen 2001). The founder of the I.R. consented to FP based on the following terms: • Consensus of both spouses on the use of contraceptives • Contraceptives should not have significant side effects • Reversibility (allowing for the possibility of a future pregnancy) • The method used should not be accompanied with sin (e.g., same sex service providers should be consulted) (Malekafzali 2004, p. 247)2. By December 1989, Iran had revived its national FP. The main goal was to limit family size to three children by encouraging women to wait three to four years between pregnancies, and by discouraging child bearing for women younger than 18 or older than 35. In May 1993, the Iranian government passed a national FP law in which it encouraged couples to have fewer children by restricting maternity leave benefits after three children. To accomplish this, there was significant involvement of the following ministries: Education; Culture and Higher Education; Health and Medical Education, and Islamic Culture and Guidance. Also, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting Corporation cooperated with the abovementioned ministries in raising public awareness on the enacted FP law (Lar2 It is worth mentioning here that abortion is not defined as a population contraceptive tool and is prohibited in the Islamic Republic except under certain conditions. 113 Why has Iran’s family planning policy been so successful?... sen 2001). The startling results of the national FP program are, despite rapid transitions in South Asia, northern Africa, and Latin America, a global anomaly and merit analysis. We argue that several factors were critical in supporting the success of Iran’s FP program. First, as we will explain in greater detail in section II, the international law provides a supportive environment for Iran to implement its FP program. Second, as we will detail in section III, different parts of the government collaborated to provide a legal context aimed at increasing public awareness, providing incentives, and increasing accessibility to contraceptive tools, especially in rural areas. Third, as discussed in section IV, rapid economic development during the period had several direct and, perhaps more importantly, indirect influences on fertility. As the cost of child rearing increased so did both the average age of women giving birth for the first time and the supply of, and demand for, contraceptives. At this time, the Iranian society was experiencing urbanization, and socio-cultural change, both supportive of a lower fertility rate. Fourth, a significant and relatively early process of urbanization and industrialization which followed the revolution considerably narrowed the urban-rural gap in health care access (section V. A). Fifth, Iran experienced a rapid improvement in women’s education after the revolution (section V. B), a critical independent determinant of fertility globally. Sixth, we argue that the impact of globalization on local cultural geographies likely increased the use of contraceptives (section V. C). Finally, as we will discuss in section VI, contrary to what has occurred in many parts of the world, rather than hinder FP adoption, religion appears to have played a mostly supportive role in Iran’s FP transition, with many religious leaders, including Ayatollah Khomeini, actively supporting the program. Underpinnings of Iran’s Fertility Transition

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Why has Iran’s family planning policy been so successful? Political, demographic, socio-economic, and cultural-geographical underpinnings of a dramatic fertility transition