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: How do adversaries manage to sit down and talk about long-standing conflicts while violence and mistrust continue to define their security relations? While official diplomatic communications are the obvious way for adversaries to talk, unofficial policy discourse, or track two diplomacy, is an increasingly important part of the changing international security landscape. Private foundations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), universities, and governments -- mostly based in the West -- have devoted significant financial and human resources to track two dialogues. What has been the payoff? This study examines track two efforts in two particularly conflict-prone regions: the Middle East and South Asia. Hundreds of unofficial regional security-related dialogues have taken place across these regions -- involving academics, diplomats, policy analysts, NGO activists, journalists, and parliamentarians -- for over 15 years. Because of the long-standing nature of the conflict and the strategic importance of the Middle East and South Asia to vital security interests in the West, these regions pose significant challenges for efforts to improve relations and cooperation among adversaries. These regions also provide useful cases to assess the nature and influence of track two dialogues by raising several critical questions. What has been the impact of such dialogues? Do we see similar types of track two efforts in these regions? Can we discern similar patterns of influence on regional security thinking and policy? Do the cases illustrate common impediments to track two efforts in non-Western contexts? If similar external actors have applied track two efforts in comparable ways, how might we explain differences in results across the two regions? Can differences between the cases suggest conditions under which track two efforts are more or less likely to succeed? What lessons can both regions suggest for other cases?

Talking to the enemy: track two diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia