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Thomas Aquinas understands providence as the reason of directing things to ends (ratio ordinis rerum in fi nem), and as the execution of that directing, i.e. governance (gubernatio). Thus, providence is one of the fundamental attributes of the person that reveals the person’s perfection and dignity. Providence consists in a free and reasonable directing of oneself and the reality subject to oneself in order to actualize potentialities of oneself and of other beings in the context of the ultimate goal of existence. Human providence joins the providence of the Absolute with regard to the world. In spite of its defi ciencies human providence reveals the essential dignity of the human person. Experience of freedom For human beings freedom is one of the most fundamental existential experiences. As Battista Mondin notices freedom is „the essential and primary constitutive component of the human person.1 The importance of this attribute is now recognized as unchallenged, in contrast to the understanding of its content which ranges from strong indeterminism to strong determinism. These extreme views give an erroneous understanding of freedom, either by claiming that freedom may ignore reality (e.g. Sartre) or by denying freedom altogether (e.g. Marxism). In the realist tradition starting with Aristotle and developed by St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas it is stressed that freedom reveals itself 1 B. Mondin, „Wolność jako istotny i pierwotny czynnik konstytutywny osoby ludzkiej” [„Freedom as the essential and primary constituent of the Human Person”], in: Człowiek w kulturze [„Man in Culture”], 9/1997, ed. Fundacja Lubelska Szkoła Filozofi i Chrześcijańskiej, p. 79. FORUM PHILOSOPHICUM 14(2009), pp. 109-118 110 PIOTR STANISŁAW MAZUR in those acts of decision named free will.2 The subject or person, as a result of the deliberative cooperation of his/her spiritual powers – intellect and will – chooses a practical judgement that determines action. The content of this judgement refers on the one hand to a given good which is the object of free action, and on the other hand – to the way of achieving it. In the realist tradition this kind of decision used to be named „self-determination”, for by means of it the person determines the horizon of their own action with regard to the good-goal. In the phase of executing this decision the human being is intentionally (through intellect and will and by the power of the act of choice) united with the good, although as yet only at the point of striving for it. Through acts of decision human beings either advance towards or move away from the ultimate end of their existence. And at the same time they shape their humanity. S. Kowalczyk, following J. Maritain, indicates a fundamental distinction between freedom as self-determination (freedom in the ontological sense) and freedom as self-autonomy (psycho-moral freedom).3 The former consists in the relative independence of the will from inner or outer constraints and in the possibility of choosing from among many alternatives. The latter in turn results from the personal choice to use freedom only for realizing the good, which is the effect of a long inner effort to act in accordance with one’s own cognition. The human being shaped in this way by decisional acts is autonomous, i.e. independent from doing evil consciously and freely as well as from external infl uences. Freedom as autonomy is, then, assigned to people as a task, for this freedom constitutes the indispensable space for self-realization – a space of a normative character. Since freedom is on the one hand given, and on the other hand – assigned to human beings, one may of course ask the question, what is the reason for this. The answer is given by indicating that human beings are persons who in the world actualize potentialities that they possess qua persons. In the case of action, the object through which the will determines and perfects itself is the good.4 The motive power behind actions undertaken by the subject or person is the need to unite with a desired good, which fulfi lls the desirelove directed to that object and perfects the person. Actions are directed 2 See: M.A. Krąpiec, „Natura ludzkiej wolności” [„The Nature of Human Freedom”], in: Człowiek w kulturze [„Man in Culture”], 9/1997, ed. Fundacja Lubelska Szkoła Filozofi i Chrześcijańskiej, p. 26. 3 S. Kowalczyk, Wolność naturą i prawem człowieka [Freedom – Man’s Nature and his Right], ed. Wydawnictwo Diecezjalne, Sandomierz 2000, p. 18. 4 The good is analogously understood as being itself when it becomes the motive for the occurrence of an action and at the same time the aim of that action. 111 DIGNITY OF THE PERSON IN THE CONTEXT OF HUMAN PROVIDENCE towards some partial goods and intentionally – to the ultimate end of life. As the realization of the good both in the individual and social (common good) dimensions action is the real and dynamic way of fulfi lling freedom. Through properly formed activity originating in freedom human beings are able to execute the providential care of themselves and the reality subject to them – or in short – to become providence. The fact of human providence Human providence is connected to two basic phenomena: care and predicting. The ability to predict a course of events and to grasp the future as future is a distinctive feature that differentiates human beings from the world of nature. Predicting is present in all human activities: cognition, action, art, and religion. Without it one can hardly imagine any organized human cognition, as cognition is quite often grounded in probabilistic reasoning applied to not yet existing but possibly occuring states of reality. Similarly, in art a certain intentional work of the artist is realized in matter by the application of some rules proper to the given domain of art. Here also it is diffi cult to imagine that no predicting takes place. Religion in turn aims by its very nature at the future union of the human person with the Absolute. However, as Aquinas rightly stresses, one can talk about providential predicting only in the practical sphere, i.e. in action. The task of providence is to predict – while taking into account the decision of the subject with regard to the content of action – both morally acceptable and effi cient means to achieve the end of action. Considered under this aspect providence belongs to the scope of the cardinal virtue which is called prudence, for it has the same subject (practical reason), the same object (fi nding and applying means for a practical aim indicated by a person’s theoretical reason), and the same goal (the good of the person). This is why St. Thomas considers providence as the most important part of prudence.5 Providence does not exhaust itself in predicting but it also includes care for the world of persons and of other beings. Human care embraces the whole of reality and includes all aspects of human existence. In comparison to beings belonging to the world of nature it has a much broader scope – both vertically and horizontally – and has fi rst of all a conscious character. However, it cannot be real care if it is not accompanied by proportional 5 See: Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 2-2, q. 49, a. 7, in: Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita, v. 4-12, Roma 1888-1903. 112 PIOTR STANISŁAW MAZUR prediction – if it does not look ahead. In providence we see, then, a peculiar fusion of practical predicting and personal care.6 The fact that providence includes care makes itself obvious when we notice that providence is not just passive predicting what means are suitable for a chosen aim. For its task is also to employ those means actively in order to achieve the good chosen in the act of decision and to do so in the context of the ultimate end of human life. Thus, providence cannot work without prudence and its particular parts which may generally be identifi ed as the remembrance of the past and the understanding of the present. It was St. Thomas who showed this double character of human providence: predicting and realizing predictions. According to Aquinas providence is the reason of things ordered towards their ends.7 In this explanation Thomas shows the structure of providence as a peculiar relation which at the point of departure obtains between a subject endowed with intellect and a goal to be achieved. For in the case of human providence, before a given action starts one must recognize reality (a concrete situation in which an action is to take place) and fi nd the means which will lead to the achievement of a determined goal or good.8 Intellect is at that moment already disposed towards action, but in this initial phase of providence it makes a judgement concerning a certain object as a suitable and attainable aim. The step, in providence, from the stage of cognition and planning to that of acting is made by the decision of the will which terminates the analyzing of possibilities and determines the one to be realized. In this moment the subject becomes a source of real causation, i.e. he starts a chain of events which are to bring about the desired end. Thomas shows that this consists in the subject’s directing things to ends.9 In human care for the reality subject to persons there occurs a governance which should be analogously understood (gubernatio). It should be seen as the active execution of the virtue of provi6 The care here considered is seen as having a personal, dynamic, creative character. This sense is connected to the understanding of the human person as a potential being who cares for himself and the surrounding reality. Thus, this type of care is different from the Heideggerian one understood as the Angst before existential destruction which is manifested in the fact that humans are beings-towards-death (Sein zum Tode). See: M. Heidegger, Bycie i czas [Being end Time], ed. Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2004. 7 See: STh, I, q. 22, a

The Dignity of the Person in the Context of Human Providence