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Philippa Foot’s book, Natural Goodness, involves a large project including a theory of natural goodness, a theory of the virtues, and a theory of practical rationality. Natural goodness is the foundation for the rest and is used to support a more or less traditional list of the virtues and a theory of reasons for action. Though Foot’s doctrine of natural goodness may provide an account of some sort of goodness, I argue that it is not adequate as a foundation for practical rationality or as a defense of more or less traditional virtues. Philippa Foot has been one of moral naturalism’s most loyal proponents. She has developed a number of naturalistic moral theories culminating in her most recent work, Natural Goodness. Though a slim volume, it involves a large project including a theory of the good, this being her theory of natural goodness, a theory of the virtues, and a theory of practical rationality, that is, of reasons for action. Natural goodness is the foundation for the rest of the theory and is used to support a more or less traditional list of the virtues and a theory of reasons for action with an important feature. She challenges a common idea that only self-interest or desire provide reasons for action of a sort relevant to practical rationality. She writes that the rationality of, say, telling the truth, keeping promises, or helping a neighbour is on a par with the rationality of self-preserving action, and of the careful and cognizant pursuit of other innocent ends; each being a part or aspect of practical rationality. The different considerations are on a par, moreover, in that a judgment about what is required by practical rationality must take account of their interaction: of the weight of the ones we call non-moral as well as those we call moral. (2001, p. 11) FORUM PHILOSOPHICUM 14(2009), pp. 1-15

Philippa Foot’s Theory of Natural Goodness