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Abstract. Many studies of experimental economics have producedoutcomes which contradict the predictions of Nash equilibrium,which relies heavily upon the premise of sel shness of an individ-ual. In the games involving contexts of social conicts representedby the prisoners’ dilemma game, the experiments yields outcomesquite di erent from what are predicted by the conventional wisdom.In order to ll this gap between the conventional Nash Equilibriumand experimental outcomes, non-sel sh (or other-regarding) mo-tives of human behavior are introduced and then a new equilibriumconcept, RAE-equilibrium is developed. It is also proved that anRAE-equilibrium exists under quite general conditions. Then it isapplied to the prisoners’ dilemma game that some of the experi-mental outcomes can be explained. 1. IntroductionThe intention of a country or an institution that provides commonpool resources is to manage and/or maintain ways to enable many peopleto use the commons e ectively for a long period of time. However, itis a well-known fact that the use by unspeci c multi-parties withoutany restriction causes the economic ineciency of resources under theabuse in so-called ‘the tragedy of the commons’. Existing studies on theissue of abusing commons have three analysis models: the tragedy ofthe commons, the prisoner’s dilemma game and the logic of collective

AN APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF COMMON POOL RESOURCES THROUGH AN EXTENSION OF THE EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPT