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It has been attempted to explain the crisis of the Eurozone by a number of economic arguments, including uneven macroeconomic developments among Member States, current account surpluses (North) against deficits (South), a lack of labour mobility and the creation of a Monetary Union without common fiscal and banking policies. However, on a more fundamental level, even the most basic rules of the Eurozone were hardly ever monitored sufficiently, let alone enforced. The convergence norms of the Maastricht Treaty were not implemented according to the “logic of appropriateness” outlined in New Institutionalism, leading instead to widespread strategic behaviour (gaming) on a massive scale. Weak surveillance and an absence of enforcement mechanisms have resulted in a situation where only the principle of debt mutuality can provide the Eurozone with urgently necessary breathing space. The question remains, however, whether the new institutions to be put in place as a “quid pro quo” for debt mutualisation – the Fiscal Pact, a banking union and tighter debt and deficit surveillance – will be respected and enforced.

Rules and Incentives in the Eurozone Crisis