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The article discusses why shareholder-oriented company policy became popular among German managers in the 1990s despite the fact that it increased the market's influence on corporations and thus appeared to limit the managers' room for maneuver. This question can best be answered by combining agency theory and management sociology. The argument is carried out in three steps. First, it is shown that the 1990s witnessed changes in backgrounds and typical career features of top executives that increased their willingness to adopt shareholder-oriented strategies. Second, increasing control by markets was counterbalanced by decreasing control by insiders; in sum, not the quantity, but the quality of control over managers changed. Third, it is demonstrated that this change in the quality of control led to increasing managerial compensation and was therefore compatible with managers' interests. The arguments are backed up by data that cover the 40 largest German stock corporations during the 1990s.

Was bewegt die Führungskräfte? Von der Agency-Theorie zur Soziologie des Managements