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Thanks to HTML5, users can now view videos on Web browsers without installingplug-ins or relying on specific devices. In 2017, W3C published Encrypted MediaExtensions (EME) as the first official Web standard for Digital RightsManagement (DRM), with the overarching goal of allowing seamless integration ofDRM systems on browsers. EME has prompted numerous voices of dissent withrespect to the inadequate protection of users. Of particular interest, privacyconcerns were articulated, especially that DRM systems inherently requireuniquely identifying information on users' devices to control contentdistribution better. Despite this anecdotal evidence, we lack a comprehensiveoverview of how browsers have supported EME in practice and what privacyimplications are caused by their implementations. In this paper, we fill thisgap by investigating privacy leakage caused by EME relying on proprietary andclosed-source DRM systems. We focus on Google Widevine because of itsversatility and wide adoption. We conduct empirical experiments to show thatbrowsers diverge when complying EME privacy guidelines, which might undermineusers' privacy. For instance, we find that many browsers gladly give away theidentifying Widevine Client ID with no or little explicit consent from users.Moreover, we characterize the privacy risks of users tracking when browsersmiss applying EME guidelines regarding privacy. Because of being closed-source,our work involves reverse engineering to dissect the contents of EME messagesas instantiated by Widevine. Finally, we implement EME Track, a tool thatautomatically exploits bad Widevine-based implementations to break privacy.

Your DRM Can Watch You Too: Exploring the Privacy Implications of Browsers (mis)Implementations of Widevine EME