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Historians have argued almost unanimously that the Battle of Khalkhin Gol was initiated by the aggression of Imperial Japanese forces and that the outcome was a resounding victory for the Soviet Union. However, documents that have become available since the time of glasnost’ and perestroika suggest the need for subtle yet signifi cant modifi cations of this event. For instance, the Soviet/Mongol casualties turn out to be much larger than was acknowledged at the time. They in fact appear to be larger than those of the Japanese/Manchukuo forces.2 No fundamental reassessment has taken place for seventy-fi ve years. Perhaps the only notable exception is Aleksei A. Kirichenko, a Russian specialist of Japan. Taking issue with his colleagues, Kirichenko claims that Japan did not start the short war: “This [Russian historians’ claim about Japan’s provocation of the Khalkhin Gol confl ict] contradicts the simplest logic, because at that time Japan was, in the literal sense of the word, mired in the war in China and only the insane would have undertaken military actions against Soviet troops (even in Mongolia)” [Ýòî ïðîòèâîðå÷èò ïðîñòåéøåé ëîãèêå, èáî â ýòîò ïåðèîä ßïîíèÿ â áóêâàëüíîì ñìûñëå óâÿçëà â âîéíå â Êèòàå è çàòåâàòü áîåâûå äåéñòâèÿ ñ ñîâåòñêèìè âîéñêàìè (ïóñòü äàæå â Ìîíãîëèè) ìîã òîëüêî ñóìàñøåäøèé.3 Yet, unfortunately, his work has been almost completely ignored in Russia. One barrier to a clear understanding of the issues is that numerous relevant documents are still classifi ed in Moscow’s various archives. It is also likely that Tokyo still withholds relevant archival documents. Historians need unrestricted access to all archival documents. When examined, they may support established 1 Professor of History, Indiana University (USA) (hkuromiy@indiana.edu) 2 The Soviet casualties were 25,655 (of them 7,624 killed, 2,028 missing in action, 15,251 wounded). (See Ã. Ô. Êðèâîøååâ (ðåä.), Россия и СССР в войнах хх века: потери вооруженных сил. Статистическое исследование [Ìîñêâà: ÎËÌÀ-ÏÐÅÑÑ, 1993], p. 179.) Japan’s casualties are 19,714 (8,717 killed, 8,647 wounded). 3 See, for example, À. À. Êèðè÷åíêî, “ ‘Ðàçáîðêà’ íà Õàëõèí-Ãîëå,” ßïîíèÿ íàøèõ äíåé, 2014, no. 1 (19), p. 120. New Questions on the Battle of Khalkhin Gol (Nomonhan) 50 interpretations. They may not. I suggest that the latter is the case. In this essay I will deal with four issues related to the battle of Khalkhin Gol. * * * (1). The fi rst issue concerns the commander of the Japanese main fi ghting force, the 23-rd Division, Lieutenant General Michitarō Komatsubara, who, as I have suggested in an earlier article, may have been a Soviet agent. He had been sexually compromised in Moscow in the 1920s when he was a Military Attaché and was probably blackmailed, as were some others in his situation. He likely betrayed his country and helped the Soviet forces in some as yet unknown way during the battle which he commanded on the Japanese side. This would explain many riddles of the battle, including the fact that his division suffered an inexplicably high casualty rate.4 If this is the case, the traditional interpretation, including the presumed responsibility for the breakout of the battle, would be turned on its head. The question of Komatsubara’s possible treachery cannot be answered conclusively without access to classifi ed documents in Moscow. Historians must demand open access to all relevant documents in Moscow. If Tokyo still withholds secret documents, these too must be de-classiifi ed. Relevant documents on this particular matter are unlikely to exist in Ulaanbaatar, considering Stalin’s views on matters of intelligence. In May 1937, Stalin told his secret police (NKVD) chief Nikolai Ezhov (Íèêîëàé Åæîâ): “All allies are potential enemies, and they too have to be verifi ed. From the point of view of intelligence, we cannot have f riends: there are actual enemies and there are potential enemies. So we cannot reveal any secrets to anyone” [Âñå ñîþçíèêè âîçìîæíûå âðàãè è ñîþçíèêîâ òîæå íàäî ïðîâåðÿòü. Ñ òî÷êè çðåíèÿ ðàçâåäêè ó íàñ íå ìîæåò áûòü äðóçåé, åñòü íåïîñðåäòñâåííûå âðàãè, åñòü âðàãè âîçìîæíûå. / Ïîýòîìó íèêàêèõ ñåêðåòîâ íèêîìó íå äàâàòü.].5 Any actions by Komatsubara in the interest of Moscow would have been kept secret by Stalin from his Mongolian friends (who were in fact “potential enemies” from Stalin’s point of view). (2) Another puzzling question is the timing of the battle and Stalin’s calculations. Nicholas Poppe, a famous Russian Mongolist, presents the following story of 1939. 4 See, for example, À. À. Êèðè÷åíêî, “ ‘Ðàçáîðêà’ íà Õàëõèí-Ãîëå,” Япония наших дней, 2014, no. 1 (19), p. 120. 5 Hiroaki Kuromiya, “The Mystery of Nomonhan, 1939,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 24:4 (December 2011), pp. 659–77. On Komatsubara, Russian historian V. Datsyshen has recently published an essay: Â. Äàöûøåí, “ ‘Ìèññèÿ Êîìàöóáàðû.’ Èç èñòîðèè ñîâåòñêî-ÿïîíñêî-êèòàéñêèõ îòíîøåíèé â íà÷àëå 1930-õ ãîäîâ,” Проблемы Дальнего Востока, 2012, no. 3, pp. 126–-133. Datsyshen does not question Komatsubara’s real loyalty, however.