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In the last decade, civic crowdfunding has proved to be effective ingenerating funds for the provision of public projects. However, the existingliterature deals only with citizen's with positive valuation and symmetricbelief towards the project's provision. In this work, we present novelmechanisms which break these two barriers, i.e., mechanisms which incorporatenegative valuation and asymmetric belief, independently. For negativevaluation, we present a methodology for converting existing mechanisms tomechanisms that incorporate agents with negative valuations. Particularly, weadapt existing PPR and PPS mechanisms, to present novel PPRN and PPSNmechanisms which incentivize strategic agents to contribute to the projectbased on their true preference. With respect to asymmetric belief, we propose areward scheme Belief Based Reward (BBR) based on Robust Bayesian Truth Serummechanism. With BBR, we propose a general mechanism for civic crowdfundingwhich incorporates asymmetric agents. We leverage PPR and PPS, to present PPRxand PPSx. We prove that in PPRx and PPSx, agents with greater belief towardsthe project's provision contribute more than agents with lesser belief.Further, we also show that contributions are such that the project isprovisioned at equilibrium.

Civic Crowdfunding for Agents with Negative Valuations and Agents with Asymmetric Beliefs