English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

In this paper we show how a greater pay-for-performance in managerial compensation may reduce the cost of corporate debt. The model points to the relation between the bonus and the monitoring effort by shareholders as key to reduce the cost of debt and hence increase the value of the company. Incentivizing the manager with a bonus related to the company’s performance, provided that the information is disclosed to investors, not only reduces the moral hazard between managers and share-holders, but more importantly between shareholders and bond-holders. The model predicts i) a lower corporate bond yield when there is disclosure of managerial pay-performance to nancial markets, and ii) an increasing degree of managerial pay-for-performance with company’s leverage.

Managerial Compensation and Corporate Bond Yield with Active Shareholders