A Responsabilidade Criminal no Tribunal Penal Internacional

Consciousness and willingness are the basic psychological functions which determine a person’s conduct and attitudes. Therefore, both of these subjects presume the existence of the agent penal responsibility. The Rome Statute foresees in the 25th article the International Criminal Court competence of judging the penal responsibility of people who have committed crimes due to the quoted law. On the other hand, the 31st article, paragraph a of the same document foresees the exclusion causes of that responsibility when the crime was committed by a person who endures pain of mind being incapable of evaluating what is right or wrong or the nature of his/her conduct or yet that does not have the capacity of controlling the behavior for not transgressing the law. During conflicts and wars it is very common the occurrence of reactive psychotic upsets caused by stressful situations. Such circumstances can break out paranoiac and violent reactions, depriving the infraction agent of the discernment; the quoted 31st article of Rome Statute applies in these cases. The great question is what would be the position adopted on a judgment by the International Criminal Court, once the Statute does not foresee the appliance of secure measures in such cases, as well as it does not foresee investigation for detecting the existence of mental disturbance in the moment of the punishable action. The subject in question still requires much discussion for it can not be appreciated by the International Criminal Court yet. However, it is important to dedicate the attention to the problem of mental disturbances since it is notorious that the traumas caused by wars and armed conflicts transform peaceful people into potential warriors.