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In the article the discussions about the problem of meaning in thephilosophy of language of analytic tradition of contemporary philosophy are considered. They are ambiguous, take place in the formal logicalplane and presuppose a special metaphysical discourse; involveelaborations about the problem of truth; syntactic, semantic andpragmatic levels of language and speech. It seems acceptable to postulateradical skepticism about meaning of linguistic expressions, avoid anyactive operation with the concept of meaning in philosophicalinvestigations in general, and in philosophy of language, in particular. Tojustify such a position we appeal to some ideas of L. Wittgenstein and tominimalistic approach about the problem of truth of P. Horwich.Scientific study of language and language in use are considered in thephilosophy of language. It could strive to clarify meanings of natural languagesas well as meanings of artificial formal languages. The use of language can beprivate (in a conscious thought) and public (even institutionalized) – incommunication. Language always has representational character. Linguisticsentences represent the world (in portions) as being in a certain way. Assertiveutterance represents the world to be in a way it describes it. Representationalcontents of sentences depend on their grammatical structure and other technicallinguistic properties. Representational content of a sentence is its meaning anddepends on representational contents of its parts, constitutive elements.Studying of meanings involves relationship between meaning and truthof linguistic unit (sentence). The systematic study of meaning requires aframework for specifying the truth conditions of sentences. The basis forthe finding of these conditions is provided by syntactic structure of asentence and the representational contents of its parts. The latter hassemantic scope. Four main logical systems of the beginning of XXthcentury, by G. Frege, B. Russell, A. Tarski, R. Carnap, were devoted toformally analyze the meaning and truth of linguistic expressions with theprimary attention to the syntactic level. Elaborations of them lead torecognize the lack of semantics, interconnectedness between syntacticand semantic levels of semiotics (as a general theory of signs, the thirdpart of which is pragmatics, and it was brought into attention ofphilosophers of language and logicians a bit latter).In the middle of XXth century philosophical analyses of languageconcentrate on context-sensitivity and intensionality of natural languages.There appeared context-sensitive intensional logical systems, possibleworld’s semantics. Outstanding examples of such elaborations areprovided by logical systems of S. Kripke, R. Montague, D. Lewis,R. Stalnaker, D. Kaplan.This time, modal concepts like «necessary», «possible», «could»,«would», temporal and indexical notions were paid attention to, whichenriched the framework for studying meaning. But new challenges,including metaphysical, were aroused. The status of contents ormeanings, that are expressed by sentences appeared problematic in bothstreams of dealing with it: as possible world states and as propositionalattitudes. Further, from the side of philosophy of mind the question abouthow meanings are related to cognitive (mental) states came to the fore.Linguistic expressions are relevant only in the process of theirrealization. So their value consists in particular realization of our abilityto utter something. And this value is the only instance of theirsignificance. Mostly meanings are just titles. Meaning as a philosophicalcategory is redundant. Linguistic expression is significant in every realization of it by a speaker. We mean in the process of particular speechrealization of a linguistic expression. Our words mean, but do not havemeaning. Meaning is a linguistic, speech acting. When we analyze a contentof linguistic expression, we consider how it was meaningfully used, how itmeant, not the meaning it refers to. At the same time there could be somespecial context when we operate with the process of linguistic meaningconceptually, analyze it as a possible sample. Utterance is understood in abroad sense of expression. We can produce the utterance in a givencontext. Apart from the situation where it is used it has no such a statusof significance. Linguistic expressions are relevant only in the process oftheir accomplishing

КОЛІЗІЇ ПРО «ЗНАЧЕННЯ» В ФІЛОСОФІЇ МОВИ АНАЛІТИЧНОЇ ТРАДИЦІЇ СУЧАСНОЇ ФІЛОСОФІЇ