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Proof of security of cryptographic protocols theoretically establishes thestrength of a protocol and the constraints under which it can perform, it doesnot take into account the overall design of the protocol. In the past modelchecking has been successfully applied to classical cryptographic protocols toweed out design flaws which would have otherwise gone unnoticed. Quantumcryptographic protocols differ from their classical counterparts, in theirability to detect the presence of an eavesdropper. Although unconditionalsecurity has been proven for both BB84 and B92 protocols, in this paper we showthat identifying an eavesdropper's presence is constrained on the number ofqubits exchanged. We first model the protocols in CQP and then explain themechanism by which we have translated this into a PRISM model. We mainly focuson the protocols' ability to detect an active eavesdropper and the extent towhich an eavesdropper can retrieve the shared key without being detected byeither party. We then conclude by comparing the performance of the protocols.

Modelling and Analysis of Quantum Key Distribution Protocols, BB84 and B92, in Communicating Quantum Processes(CQP) language and Analysing in PRISM