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Yeh et al. recently have proposed a mutual authentication protocol based onEPC Class-1 Gen.-2 standard [1]. They have claimed that their protocol issecure against adversarial attacks and also provides forward secrecy. In thispaper we will show that the proposed protocol does not have proper securityfeatures. A powerful and practical attack is presented on this protocol wherebythe whole security of the protocol is broken. Furthermore, Yeh et al. protocoldoes not assure the untraceabilitiy and backward untraceabilitiy aspects.Namely, all past and next transactions of a compromised tag will be traceableby an adversary.

Practical Attacks on a RFID Authentication Protocol Conforming to EPC C-1 G-2 Standard