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As our scientific theories mature, the models and frameworks we employ approach greater clarity. With this piece, I present a graphic model of Ostrom's (1992) The Rudiments of a Theory of the Origins, Survival, and Performance of CommonProperty Institutions in order to clarify the nature of its theoretical components and depict in visual form how those components interact. While Ostrom's work continues to inspire a great deal of theoretical and empirical research, the 1992 piece is the most comprehensive, yet succinct presentation of factors influencing collective action. Ostrom's (1992) theory was based on a number of case studies, and it parsed the management of common property into three states-1) institutional origins, 2) survival, and 3) performance-and sketched out qualitative cost-benefit models for each of these states. The framework sketched out in the 1992 chapter first laid out the conditions under which "appropriator organizations" would arise; specifically, resource characteristics, demand vs. supply, and characteristics of individuals forming the organization. Appropriator organizations are more likely to survive under yet other conditions, relating largely to rule enforcement, legitimacy supported by other institutions, and non-rapid change. Ultimately, an organization's performance depends on efficiency (sustainability and a positive benefitxost ratio) and equity (match between users and organization members, positive benefitxost ratio in operation of the organization, and knowledge acquired about resource and users). There is intuitive and practical appeal to separating out three states in the management of common property resources. An organization must begin. It then must survive. And survival usually is not sufficient-some balance between equity and efficiency is required for long-term performance. In order to begin to understand the relative importance of various factors, I have merged all three states in Figure 1 by combining the factors from each of Ostrom's states that are repeated in the other states, yet still maintaining connections between different factors. My motivation for combining these states into one phase is that as researchers we each tend to deal with our own little pieces of the common property management puzzle and often lose site of the larger picture. This essay is intended as a relatively holistic reference, from which aspects can be extracted and more fully developed while remaining aware of the connections with other parts of the theory. For example, a study on trust among the users of a common property resource must fit into a framework that considers the user group institution's own effect, or even the government's effect, on building trust. By presenting a graphic model as a baseline for charting Ostrom's multi-tier theory, I hope to make theory of collective action more accessible for evaluation. By using graphical conventions, we are forced to have new conversations about the nature of the factors involved and the relations between them. The graphical conventions allow us to place the factors into a variety of compartments that represent empirical entities (e.g., matter, energy, information, individuals, and institutions), as well as allow us to more clearly specify what types of flows occur between these entities. This is useful for better understanding the complexities of common-property institutions. Explication of the Graphical Model (Figure 1) I attempt throughout Figure 1to maintain the causal relationships posited by Ostrom (1992). Explication of the model is not intended to reiterate in text that which can be seen in the figure, but to offer some insights into potential challenges and interesting questions that arose as a result of my own empirical and theoretical research on collective action problems. However, some explanation of Figure 1 (and caveats) is required. Figure 1 is not an explicit cost-benefit analysis, although decision-making costs and enforcement costs are part of the model. …

Building on Ostrom's "The Rudiments of a Theory of the Origins, Survival, and Performance of Common-Property Institutions"