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Health Insurance Enrollment Decisions: Preferences for Coverage, Worker Sorting, and Insurance Take-up
Author(s) -
Alan C. Monheit,
Jessica Vistnes
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
inquiry the journal of health care organization provision and financing
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.792
H-Index - 43
eISSN - 1945-7243
pISSN - 0046-9580
DOI - 10.5034/inquiryjrnl_45.02.153
Subject(s) - business , actuarial science , group insurance , health insurance , medical expenditure panel survey , welfare , self insurance , value (mathematics) , subsidy , mandate , medical underwriting , key person insurance , insurance policy , health care , general insurance , income protection insurance , economics , economic growth , market economy , computer science , machine learning , political science , law
The weak response by the uninsured to initiatives encouraging voluntary enrollment in health insurance has raised concerns regarding the extent to which the uninsured value insurance. This concern is also relevant for proposals to mandate health insurance coverage since workers will suffer welfare losses if compelled to purchase coverage they perceive to be of little value. To address this issue, we use the 2001 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey to examine decisions by single workers to seek out and enroll in employer-sponsored insurance. We find that single workers with weak or uncertain preferences for health insurance are less likely to have jobs that offer coverage or to enroll in coverage when offered. Our results suggest a dual approach to expanding coverage that includes both subsidies and educational efforts regarding the value of health insurance.

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