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Mahāyāna Buddhists, either Mādhyamikas or Yogācāras, have traditionally adduced various types of illusions, such as a dream cognition, as examples to illustrate their thesis that everything in the world is unreal, or that there is no external reality apart from cognition. With the trend of times in India, they were eventually induced to prove their thesis in a more logical manner, that is, with a formal argument (prayoga), in which an illusory cognition serves as an illustration (dṛṣṭānta). In my previous paper (Kobayashi 2011), I have traced a historical development of the logical argument of this kind and the conclusion I arrived at was that it is likely Vasubandhu who first introduced the formulation in question. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the sources of the examples of illusory cognitions found in the Buddhist epistemological tradition, tracing the history back to pre-Vasubandu.

The Examples of Illusory Cognitions in Buddhist Epistemology and Their Sources