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We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with a single item for sale tomultiple buyers with i.i.d. valuations. Akbarpour and Li (2020) show that theonly optimal, credible, strategyproof auction is the ascending price auctionwith reserves which has unbounded communication complexity. Recent work ofFerreira and Weinberg (2020) circumvents their impossibility result assumingthe existence of cryptographically secure commitment schemes, and designs atwo-round credible, strategyproof, optimal auction. However, their auction isonly credible when buyers' valuations are MHR or $\alpha$-strongly regular:they show their auction might not be credible even when there is a single buyerdrawn from a non-MHR distribution. In this work, under the same cryptographicassumptions, we identify a new single-item auction that is credible,strategyproof, revenue optimal, and terminates in constant rounds inexpectation for all distributions with finite monopoly price.

Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for all Distributions