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We consider finite games in strategic form with Choquet expected utility.Using the notion of (unambiguously) believed, we define Choquetrationalizability and characterize it by Choquet rationality and common beliefsin Choquet rationality in the universal capacity type space in a purelymeasurable setting. We also show that Choquet rationalizability is equivalentto iterative elimination of strictly dominated actions (not in the originalgame but) in an extended game. This allows for computation of Choquetrationalizable actions without the need to first compute Choquet integrals.Choquet expected utility allows us to investigate common belief in ambiguitylove/aversion. We show that ambiguity love/aversion leads to smaller/largerChoquet rationalizable sets of action profiles.

Common Belief in Choquet Rationality and Ambiguity Attitudes -- Extended Abstract