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We prove that every Condorcet-consistent voting rule can be manipulated by avoter who completely reverses their preference ranking, assuming that there areat least 4 alternatives. This corrects an error and improves a result of[Sanver, M. R. and Zwicker, W. S. (2009). One-way monotonicity as a form ofstrategy-proofness. Int J Game Theory 38(4), 553-574.] For the case ofprecisely 4 alternatives, we exactly characterise the number of voters forwhich this impossibility result can be proven. We also show analogues of ourresult for irresolute voting rules. We then leverage our result to state astrong form of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem.

Condorcet's Principle and the Preference Reversal Paradox