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espanolEl trabajo ofrece una reflexion en torno al elemento subjetivo de la imprudencia y la delimitacion entre esta y el dolo. Se cuestionan las doctrinas que, en ambos planos, niegan la relevancia de consideraciones subjetivas y adoptan concepciones normativas motivadas por el rechazo a las posturas “psicologizantes”. Los autores argumentan el caracter doloso de aquellos supuestos que suponen conocer o asumir el hecho tipico como consecuencia practicamente segura de la conducta (dolo directo) o, al menos, con una alta probabilidad, de modo que suponga prever un peligro concreto (dolo eventual). En cambio, las conductas imprudentes se refieren a una peligrosidad (ex ante) de menor entidad y a riesgos menos irrazonables: el agente solo alcanza a considerar un peligro general, representandose un riesgo abstracto de realizacion del hecho tipico. No obstante, puede haber imprudencia penalmente relevante, aun sin representacion actual del hecho tipico, cuando se adopte un comportamiento cuya peligrosidad no puede desconocerse, justificandose de este modo la imputacion de un “deber de prevision”. EnglishThis paper deals with the subjective element of criminal negligence and the conceptual distinction between negligence, or recklessness, and intention, as different mens rea states. The authors criticize the legal theories that deny the relevance of subjective considerations while adopting normative conceptions motivated by psychologizing objections. They argue that intention requires assuming the realization of the typical event as a practically certain consequence (direct intent) or, at least, with a high probability, so that it implies foresee a specific danger (eventual intent). On the other hand, negligent harmful conducts are dangers of lesser importance (ex-ante), or less unreasonable risks: the agent is conscious of a general danger, being able to foresee an abstract risk of realization of the typical harmful event. However, there may be criminally relevant negligence, even without actual foresight, when adopting a behavior whose danger cannot be ignored, thus justifying the imputation of a “duty of foresight”.

La “vidente” imputación imprudente. Peligrosidad de la conducta y consciencia del riesgo en la definición del dolo y la imprudencia