English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

The goal of this paper is to compare the subjects and results of two French economics research programmes. The starting points are quite different which make impossible any confrontation of the first results (EC1 and TR1). Then, the paths of the two programmes converge on the same project, i.e. the institutions. Scientific confrontation between both becomes possible. About institutions the two programmes set up different proposals EC2 and TR2). These differences mainly disclose some complementarity : they can be seen as results of a labour division : on one hand EC deals with actors coordination through convention ; on the other hand, TR deals with social conflicts arbitration through codified laws understood as political agreements. If this division of labour was useful at the time, now, it is harmful, because it leads to limits on both sides. Beyond this division of labour, we propose a articulated analysis of relations between conventions and law rules with an historical institutionalism approach.

Économie des conventions et théorie de la régulation : de la comparaison à la confrontation