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ing from childcare considerations, the largest gains from WFTC go to those people who were just at the end of the FC taper. It follows that WFTC will have less impact on income at low hours, and so we should expect only modest effects on participation rates for those for whom part-time work is most attractive. The lower WFTC taper implies that the incentive to work full-time as opposed to part-time is improved under WFTC so we should expect to see a shift in the composition of employment towards full-time work. A possibly unanticipated effect of the WFTC reform concerns the position for mothers with low-income spouses. Because WFTC (and FC before it) is means tested against benefit unit (i.e. the couples’) income, the secondary worker in the household faces higher income levels at low hours relative to high hours. Consequently their incentive to work is diminished. This potentially detrimental effect on the labour supply behaviour of married mothers was a feature of the empirical work by Eissa and Hoynes (1998) where the EITC expansion between 1984 and 1996 was estimated to have decreased participation by 1%+ for married mothers. To simulate the impact of a reform like WFTC we need a model that allows us to measure the changes in participation and hours from a change in the shape of the budget constraint facing these various target groups. Such a model is developed in Blundell, Duncan, McCrae and Meghir (1999). This builds on earlier work on structural simulation by Keane and Moffitt (1998) and Hoynes (1996), and provides a similar framework to Bingley and Walker (1997) and Preston and Walker (1999), see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for an extensive review. In particular, it allows for childcare demands to vary with hours worked. It also allows for fixed costs of work and stigma which are found to be important. As we have seen, WFTC is designed to influence the work incentives of those with low potential returns to work in the labour market. It does this via the increased generosity of in-work means-tested benefits. For single parents the WFTC does unambiguously increase the incentive to work. For secondary workers in couples, however, the incentives created by the WFTC lead to lower participation in the labour market – at least, if we adopt the model of labour supply which assumes

Working Families’ Tax Credit A Review of the Evidence, Issues and Prospects for Further Research