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The existing literature has been rather critical of the way the EU has reacted to the conflict in Libya. It has even argued that it represented yet another example of EU incoherence and inconsistency. This article qualifies substantially those criticisms by providing evidence to the contrary: first, by using the “time factor”, it argues that first impressions are often misleading, and that most criticisms based on earlier studies had been published even before the fall of Gaddafi; moreover, only focusing on a few years before the 2011 conflict, they were taking a “selective memory” approach, conveniently forgetting about the role of Libya as a “pariah state” in the international community. Second, the article substantiates with evidence how the EU reaction was much more coherent and consistent than suggested. It also points out that at the end of the day, even Italy (special relationship with Gaddafi) participated in the bombing and eventually Germany (abstention at the UN) closed ranks. It also adds further data by presenting the impact of one of the most long-standing anti-Gaddafi institutions: that of the European Parliament which spurred the Union into promoting a practical implementation of the concept of Responsibility to Protect. Thirdly, the article also criticizes the rather unrealistic views taken by many an observer, in particular those who presume of the existence of European and International Governance systems that simply do not reflect reality. Thus, the conclusion is that initial harsh criticisms should be somehow qualified, especially if one takes into account the learning curve that EU foreign policy appears to show, when its reaction to Libya is compared to those of the Balkans in the 1990s or to the Iraq war in 2003.

“EU incoherence and inconsistency over Libya”: evidence to the contrary