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Some assessments of what is good for a person focus on the state of the person at a moment or during a short period of time and how the person is faring then. These are assessments of the person’s wellbeing at that time. Other assessments take the person’s full life into view, saying how good that life is on the whole. These are assessments of lifegoodness. Thus delineated, assessments of wellbeing and assessments lifegoodness are different. That cannot be a controversial point. After all, the respective objects of assessment— the state of a person at a time and the series of events that compose a life— are of different kinds. But also uncontroversial is the assumption that these two kinds of assessment are so closely related that one can be understood in terms of the other via the principle that wellbeing makes a life good for the person who lives it.1 I will argue that, even on a weak interpretation of this principle, it is not true. Refuting that weak con-

Pulling Apart Well-Being at a Time and the Goodness of a Life