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This paper reports results from a linear sanction cost variant of the power-to-take game, with implications for tax policies. We compare a pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) system with an ex-post taxation system in which payroll taxes are collected at the end of the scal year. Dissatisfaction with taxation, as proxied by the sanction in the power-to-take game, is signicantly higher in an ex-post taxation system compared with the PAYE system. However, in anticipation of the higher sanction, the "tax authority" will not apply lower taxes in the former system. Communication does not decrease dissatisfaction in a signicant manner, and it is not used extensively by participants. Keywords: Experiments, Tax systems, Dissatisfaction with taxes, Power-to-take game. JEL Classication: C91; H26; D01 ESSEC Business School and THEMA, 3 Av. Bernard Hirsch, PB50105, 95021 Cergy, France. E-mail: vranceanu@essec.fr yUniversity of Bourgogne Franche-Comté, ESC Dijon-CEREN, 29, Rue Sambin, 21000 Dijon, France, and LAMETA, University of Montpellier. E-mail: angela.sutan@escdijon.eu. zESSEC Business School, Experimental Lab, 3 Av. Bernard Hirsch, PB50105, 95021 Cergy, France. E-mail: dubart@essec.fr

Insatisfaction à l’égard de l’impôt et séquence temporelle du prélèvement : une étude expérimentale