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One of the major debates concerning the nature of inferential reasoning is between counterexample-based strategies such as mental model theory and the statistical strategies underlying probabilistic models. The dual-strategy model proposed by Verschueren, Schaeken, and d'Ydewalle (2005a, 2005b) suggests that people might have access to both kinds of strategies. One of the postulates of this approach is that statistical strategies correspond to low-cost, intuitive modes of evaluation, whereas counterexample strategies are higher-cost and more variable in use. We examined this hypothesis by using a deductive-updating paradigm. The results of Study 1 showed that individual differences in strategy use predict different levels of deductive updating on inferences about logical validity. Study 2 demonstrated no such variation when explicitly probabilistic inferences were examined. Study 3 showed that presenting updating problems with probabilistic inferences modified performance on subsequent problems using logical validity, whereas the opposite was not true. These results provide clear evidence that the processes used to make probabilistic inferences are less subject to variation than those used to make inferences of logical validity.

Additional evidence for a dual-strategy model of reasoning: Probabilistic reasoning is more invariant than reasoning about logical validity