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In light of the quandaries presented by domestic law, has the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 (“BWC”) also been so outpaced by the technologies that it is no longer effective and meaningful in international law? Part II will examine the continuum of official actions that have attempted to keep pace with the growing biotechnologies that may present threats to global biosecurity through interpreting the BWC. Part III looks at how these definitions may not be sufficient. Finally, Part IV looks at other mechanisms that may provide a better way of controlling biological weapons than redefining the technologies through the current processes.

Emerging Biotechnologies and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention