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O debate recente sobre coalizoes de paises em desenvolvimento no GATT/WTO, estimulado em grande parte pelo livro de Narlikar (2003), tem negligenciado a importância das politicas domesticas para o resultado das negociacoes em instituicoes de comercio. Neste artigo, argumentamos que o entendimento das politicas domesticas e condicao necessaria, embora nao suficiente, para explicar os resultados de barganhas entre paises ricos e coalizoes de paises em desenvolvimento. Nesse sentido, duas condicoes, nao mutuamente excludentes, influenciam os desempenhos das coalizoes internacionais: (1 o ) pais ou paises poderosos contrarios as coalizoes analisadas que buscam fragmentar os interesses domesticos das nacoes participantes dessas coalizoes; e (2 o ) coalizoes de paises em desenvolvimento que buscam influenciar a politica domestica do pais ou das nacoes mais poderosas que a elas se contrapoem. Para sustentar nossos argumentos, analisaremos dois casos de coalizoes internacionais: a Campanha de Acesso a Medicamentos contra o HIV/Aids e o Grupo dos 20 (G-20). The current debate about Coalitions of Developing Countries in the GATT/WTO was stimulated, largely, in the Narlikar´s book (2003) have neglected the importance fromthe domestic policies to the result of the negotiations in trade institutions. In this article, we argue that the understanding from domestic policies is the requisition, but not enough, to explain the results of the political bargains between rich countries and coalitions between developing countries.  In this way, there are two conditions, not mutually excluding, influencing the performances of Internationals Coalitions: (1o)  One or more powerful Countries that are  against these alliances search disintegrate the domestics interests from the participators Nations from these union; (2o) Alliance from developing countries seeking to influence the domestic policy from country or from more countries that are against it. To support our argument, we will analyze two cases of internationals coalitions: The Access to Medicines Campaign against to HIV/Aids and The Group 20 (G-20).

brazilian journal of international relations

Coalizões Internacionais, Países em Desenvolvimento e Política Doméstica nas Negociações do Gatt/WTO / The Internationals Coalitions, Developing countries and the Domestic Policy in the negotiations from Gatt/WTO