English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

No presente artigo proponho-me a reconstruir, o mais claramente possivel o “paradoxo cetico” a partir do modo como apresentado por Saul Kripke em seu Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982). Seu argumento sustenta que nao ha fatos ou razoes que justifiquem nosso emprego de termos como dotados de significados. Para tanto, interponho as distincoes que julgo pertinentes a adequada compreensao do tema, formulando os requisitos necessarios a sua adequada resposta, a saber, o ontologico, o normativo e o da identificacao extensional no tempo. Ao final, contrasto o ceticismo ora objeto de analise com sua versao epistemologica classica. Abstract In the present paper I propose to rebuild as clearly as possible the “skeptical paradox” from the way presented by Saul Kripke in his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982). His argument maintains that there are no facts or reasons justifying our use of terms as having meaning. Therefore, I interpose the distinctions that I consider relevant to the proper understanding of the subject and I formulate the requirements necessary for its proper response, namely the ontological, the normative and the extensional identification in time. Finally, I contrast semantic skepticism with its classical epistemological version.

Seguir regras e significado: o argumento cético-semântico revisitado