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Relationship between innovation subsidies and corporate strategic choices has been extensively studied. Public innovation subsidies are by no means a certain value, existing in the form of an effective range instead. This means that the public innovation subsidies existing within the reasonable range can achieve the same incentive effect. So, what is the reasonable range or the effective boundaries of public innovation subsidies to promote enterprises that adopt cooperation strategies? There is no definite answer. Based on classical game theory, a stochastic evolutionary game model is proposed in this paper, which takes into account the influence of random disturbance on the strategy evolution process. An effective boundary of public innovation subsidy is provided as the main contribution based on a mature game scenario. A set of experimental data is subsequently selected as the sample for numerical simulation and result verification. The results showed that the probability of noncooperation within the effective value range will successfully converge to zero, which also means that the agents will adopt a collaborative cooperation strategy. The regulation effect of the combination of multiple variables is also discussed.

Effective Boundary of Innovation Subsidy: Searching by Stochastic Evolutionary Game Model