English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Based on the empirical data of China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share market, this paper examined the impact of regional anti-corruption intensity on corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure. The results indicate that (1) regional anti-corruption intensity has a significant positive effect on firms’ CSR disclosure; (2) through the grouping test based on the ownership of firms, it was found that the positive effect of anti-corruption intensity on CSR disclosure in the sample of non-state-owned enterprises was more significant and positive than that of state-owned enterprises (SOEs); and (3) through the grouping test of whether or not the enterprises had political connections, the positive effect of regional anti-corruption intensity on CSR disclosure was stronger and more significant in firms with political connections (relative to those with no or weak political connections). This paper sheds light on the research into anti-corruption policies by linking government macro policy and enterprises’ micro social economic behaviors, and it provides empirical evidence for this linkage. This paper also contributes to organizational legitimacy theory and CSR theory by probing the impact of anti-corruption policies on firms’ CSR disclosure. At the same time, the effects of two contingency factors (ownership and political connection) also provide some practical implications to the relevant government departments by: (1) speeding up the market-oriented reform of state-owned enterprises including clarifying the boundaries of authority and responsibility between SOEs and the government, and conducting the de-administration of managers of SOEs; and (2) encouraging firms to focus on market competition and be more socially responsible, instead of speculating with political rents.

Regional Anti-Corruption and CSR Disclosure in a Transition Economy: The Contingent Effects of Ownership and Political Connection