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One of the challenges for chemical processes today, from a safety and profit standpoint, is the potential that cyberattacks could be performed on components of process control systems. Safety issues could be catastrophic; however, because the nonlinear systems definition of a cyberattack has similarities to a nonlinear systems definition of faults, many processes have already been instrumented to handle various problematic input conditions. Also challenging is the question of how to design a system that is resilient to attacks attempting to impact the production volumes or profits of a company. In this work, we explore a process/equipment design framework for handling safety issues in the presence of cyberattacks (in the spirit of traditional HAZOP thinking), and present a method for bounding the profit/production loss which might be experienced by a plant under a cyberattack through the use of a sufficiently conservative operating strategy combined with the assumption that an attack detection method with characterizable time to detection is available.

Mitigating Safety Concerns and Profit/Production Losses for Chemical Process Control Systems under Cyberattacks via Design/Control Methods