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We consider a man-in-the-middle attack on two-way quantum key distributionping-pong and LM05 protocols in which an eavesdropper copies all messages inthe message mode, while being undetectable in the mode. Under the attack thereis therefore no disturbance in the message mode and the mutual informationbetween the sender and the receiver is always constant and equal to one andmessages copied by the eavesdropper are always genuine. An attack can only bedetected in the control mode but the level of detection at which the protocolshould be aborted is not defined. We examine steps of the protocol to evaluateits security and find that the protocol should be redesigned. We also compareit with the security of a one-way asymmetric BB84-like protocol in which onebasis serves as the message mode and the other as the control mode but whichdoes have the level of detection at which the protocol should be aborteddefined.

How Secure Are Two-Way Ping-Pong and LM05 QKD Protocols under a Man-in-the-Middle Attack?