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We introduce the so far most efficient attack against theKirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system. This attackutilizes the lack of exact thermal equilibrium in practical applications and isbased on cable resistance losses and the fact that the Second Law ofThermodynamics cannot provide full security when such losses are present. Thenew attack does not challenge the unconditional security of the KLJN scheme,but it puts more stringent demands on the security/privacy enhancing protocolthan for any earlier attack. In this paper we present a simple defense protocolto fully eliminate this new attack by increasing the noise-temperature at theside of the smaller resistance value over the noise-temperature at the at theside with the greater resistance. It is shown that this simple protocol totallyremoves Eve's information not only for the new attack but also for the oldBergou-Scheuer-Yariv attack. The presently most efficient attacks against theKLJN scheme are thereby completely nullified.

Elimination of a Second-Law-attack, and all cable-resistance-based attacks, in the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system