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This paper reports on an experimental test of a new market design that is attractive in theory but makes the common and potentially unrealistic assumption that â€œagents report their typeâ€ ; that is, that market participants can perfectly report their preferences to the mechanism. Concerns about preference reporting led to a novel experimental design that brought real market participantsâ€™ real preferences into the lab, as opposed to endowing experimental subjects with artificial preferences as is typical in market design. The experiment found that market participants were able to report their preferences â€œaccurately enoughâ€ to realize efficiency and fairness benefits of the mechanism even while preference-reporting mistakes meaningfully harmed mechanism performance. [Working Paper 22448]

Can Market Participants Report their Preferences Accurately (Enough)?