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This article uses cross sectional data on the characteristics of landlords and tenants in U.S. agricultural markets to study the effect of multilateral contracting on contract choice. We find evidence that tenants who rent from a relatively large number of landlords are more likely to use cash-rent, rather than crop-share, rental leases. We interpret this finding in the context of a contract-design model with multitasking. When a tenant's labor effort is allocated across multiple plots of land, one landlord's contract may influence the marginal cost of effort for the tenant operating under another's. We show how our empirical findings are consistent with this sort of contractual externality, but only when the contracts of each tenant-landlord pair are determined in isolation. If contracts are chosen cooperatively across all pairs, a reverse prediction holds. Our results therefore support the hypothesis that some institutional or transaction friction limits the communication and redistribution needed to achieve a cooperative (and Pareto-efficient) outcome. Introduction Empirical study of contract choice has focused principally on bilateral arrangements, even when potentially there are multilateral effects. For example, a franchisor may design contracts with some of its franchisees to encourage cooperation, or at least to limit opportunities for market competition among the relevant set of franchisees. Alternatively, the terms offered by a construction firm to a given client may depend in part on the firm's

Incentives and contract design: a case study of farmland lease contracts in US agriculture