English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECCs) are becoming more popular because of the reduced number of key bits required in comparison to other cryptosystems such as RSA. They are especially suited to smartcards because of the limited memory and computational power available on these devices. However, the side-channel attacks especially simple side-channel analysis (SPA) can obtain information about the cryptosystem by measuring power consumption and processing time. To resist this a ttack there appear a number of countermeasures and the most widely used methods are Montgomery ladder and double-and- add-always algorithm. This paper proposes a novel simple power analysis attack to these countermeasures. Experimental results on smart cards demonstrate that this attack method can retrieve secret keys by distinguishing the conditional subtraction of Montgomery modular multiplication (MMM). Several countermeasures that can resist this kind of SPA attack are also demonstrated in this paper. Keywords—ECC; cryptography; SPA; Montgomery modular multiplication

A Novel SPA Attack on ECC Using MMM's Conditional Subtraction